Instructive IFs of History
「もしも」の歴史学
Helping create a better world
by understanding how it could have been different
and understanding what things can be changed
and what cannot be changed.
青山康高 2021年9月19日 「もしも」の歴史学 レピドゥス対オクタヴィアヌス、シチリア反乱後の対決
The Case of Lepidus vs. Octavian, and their Squabble over Sicily
Yasutaka Barron Aoyama, PhD (c) 2021
2021.9.19
Recognizing Instructive IFs of History
The Case of Lepidus vs. Octavian, and their Squabble over Sicily
Yasutaka Aoyama, PhD
Poor Lepidus! He was the least admired of the three leaders of the 2nd Roman Triumvirate formed in 43 B.C. (comprised of Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus) in his own day and after—all the way up to this day. As the years went by, Octavian grew strong in Rome, and Lepidus, fretting over Octavian’s increasing disregard for him, in 36 B.C. attempted to maintain his equality as triumvir by claiming Sicily as his to rule, having been instrumental at the time in quelling the Sextus Pompey rebellion there, with which Octavian had little success in doing alone. This claim however, was disdainfully rejected by Octavian, who, by his personal appearance backed by the threat of force, got many of Lepidus’s legions to defect to him, resulting in the end of Lepidus’ career as triumvir.
Yet a small difference in negotiating approach, which Lepidus in fact was so skilled in, could have made Octavian’s acquiescence to the possession of Sicily more likely. —How so? Quite simply, by Lepidus asking for some sort of jurisdiction over Sicily before landing with his numerous legions there. That is, demanding beforehand that the island or at least part of the island become under his jurisdiction, and if not that, at least receive territories elsewhere, were he to be successful in helping to subdue the rebellion. Important too, would be the stipulation that such an agreement be a written one, signed with prominent witnesses. It would be an agreement that the hard-pressed Octavian could hardly refuse at the time, in some form. But even if Octavian refused to sign a public agreement, or secret one, assenting only to making a verbal promise, but one known to Lepidus’s own subordinates (his legionary commanders), that would have been sufficient to hinder them from defecting to Octavian later.
Furthermore, such a demand made before giving his aid would have allowed Lepidus to know the true intentions of Octavian. In the case Octavian completely refused any sort of agreement, it would then be clear that any demands by Lepidus to keep the island afterwards would obviously be denied, and that Octavian probably intended to deny Lepidus much more in the future. Also, an upfront denial would give Lepidus another option, that of refusing to assist Octavian altogether, on the condition that Octavian offered nothing whatsoever in return. Then some sharp-tongued historian under Lepidus’s patronage might leave an embellished line by Lepidus for posterity such as: “What then Octavian, do you offer to thank me and my legionaries with, for the service performed? Nothing, nothing at all? You have asked for and received the world, yet you would deprive us of a mere island?” Another benefit of receiving even a false promise of at least partial Sicilian overlordship would have been that he could then in turn promise to his legionaries, before the invasion, Sicilian land grants (just as he had been doing so in Africa for his veterans), sharing with his legionaries Octavian’s promise, and how it would be a test of Octavian’s true character. If Octavian renegaded on his vow, that would hardly make Lepidus’s legions inclined toward defecting over to such a blatant prevaricator...
Lepidus was a good strategist and negotiator, prudent and realistic, choosing the path with the highest chances of survival rather than the most glorious success. In that sense, it is strange that he did not think of this idea himself. Perhaps deep down inside he lacked the confidence to do so, that is to ask first, before having given. What he lacked was charisma—the daring and audacity of speech and action that true confidence gives—to charm his troops and keep them loyal to himself. But charisma is not necessarily a prerequisite for political success. Not all successful leaders have had it. They have relied instead on either the trappings of authority, such as the Hapsburg monarchs, or mechanisms of maintaining power, such as Stalin. There were ways for Lepidus to enhance both. Though kingship was taboo for Romans, there were other means by which Lepidus could have enhanced his status within Africa by his own administrative ingenuity; his support in Rome by public relations and diplomacy without intrigue as the high priest Pontifex Maximus that he was; and his overall reputation by the old means of popularity winning policies and proclamations. And like 20th century dictators, he could have enhanced his control over his legions by surveillance and additional policing powers. Though Octavian was destined to be emperor, perhaps Lepidus, known as a most loyal supporter of Julius Caesar to whom Octavian owed everything, could have carved out a comfortable niche for himself, extracted a concession as governor plenipotentiary of Africa for life, or something of that sort...
—But alas, I was not there to advise him!
青山康高 2021年9月 教授方法論としての「もしも」の歴史学
The IFs of History as a Pedagogic Tool:
Pondering the IFs of history drives us to better understand the facts as they are.
An example of a 3 stage progression in historical thinking
Stage I: Pondering in isolation a possible IF of military strategy
青山康高 2021年9月2日 「もしも」の歴史学 ナポレオンのロシア遠征
2021.9.2
Recognizing Instructive ‘IFs of History’
The Example of Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia
Yasutaka Aoyama, PhD
Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812, with the goal of bringing the Russian empire to its knees. But Napoleon should have considered a limited war of liberation for the Ukraine, rather than the unconditional obedience of Russia via the defeat of its army. In other words, if he had limited his medium range goals, loudly proclaimed, to that of Ukrainian liberation, Tsar Alexander I of Russia would have been lured into and forced to fight an open battle, on open fields in the Ukraine, and much sooner than the historical Battle of Borodino. Winters would have been milder, marching distances reasonable, and logistics far more manageable for the French army. Surely Napoleon would have been able to gather local support as well, for a war of liberation, perhaps enlist local volunteers, and create a militia of perhaps some 30,000 to 60,000 or more to form the basis of a garrison and army to maintain his position there.
Such a medium-term goal, if it had succeeded, would have made his ultimate goal much more feasible in the future. That is to say, he needed to take a two or three phased approach to his grand plan: first the Ukraine, with the necessary diplomacy beforehand (such as mending relations with Sultan Mahmud II of the Ottoman Empire by returning Moldavia and Wallachia as earlier promised, and giving the Cossacks autonomy); second the Baltic region, with the necessary diplomacy beforehand (such as a major rethinking of his relations with Sweden’s King Charles John, offering him guarantees of suzerainty over Finland and Norway); and finally the center, with each phase spaced over a year or more for consolidation.
The liberation of Ukraine would have been more than enough punishment for the breach of the Continental Blockade against Britain, no less than say, if Italy had been rendered from the French Empire by England or Russia, as punishment for some offense by France. Napoleon would have been able to save face with the liberation of the Ukraine, even if limited to its Right Bank (territories west of the Dnieper) and achieve a possibly sustainable extension (ostensibly as ally) of the French Empire—and what’s more keep the imperial crown on his head—but alas, I was not there to advise him!
Disclaimer: This is purely an exercise in creative thinking, an example of the value of pondering the ifs of history, as I did almost 30 years ago in my introductory classes in Western Civilization at Colorado Mountain College in the early/mid-1990’s, sending copies of my Ifs to other teachers, and, though with no credit to my name, might have been the ignition for the big If movement in historical and educational circles that started back in the late 1990s. Until then, for those who recall, ‘There are no IFs in history—period’ was the final word, the prevailing and politically correct academic stance in those days.
Napoleon is an example, and no sides are being taken here. I would do the same for the Russian side, should I have a worthwhile insight to offer. The point is the value of learning from the ifs of history, and in no way does this piece reflect a political opinion or suggestion of what should have happened, simply an exercise in considering what could have happened with a small difference in strategic counsel. And herein lies the chief value of the ifs of history, in investigating the historically possible path that was not taken, not in the wild and historically impossible ifs that we often find nowadays, along the lines of “If Native Americans had machine guns, would they have been able to stop the westward movement of white settlers and the US Cavalry?” ―Though even that has possible value for the motion picture industry.
Stage II: Testing one's conclusions against other possible IFs, not only the facts against a single possible alternative, but against the universe of possible alternatives, leading to a refining of one's initial understanding of the historical circumstances.
青山康高 2021年9月10日 後書 ナポレオンのロシア遠征
2021.9.10
Afterword
Recognizing Instructive ‘IFs of History’
The Example of Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia: Why the Ukraine and Not the Baltics
Yasutaka Aoyama, PhD
Perhaps the reader might question why I proposed the Ukraine first, and the Baltic region second? Afterall, the Continental Blockade could be better enforced by taking the coastline facing the Baltic Sea, as surely it was the main outlet by which Russia was circumventing the blockade.
The answer is twofold and the two aspects intertwined. Firstly, geography and climate, and secondly, geopolitics and diplomacy. An invasion of the Baltic region would have likely meant an invasion all the way up to St. Petersburg to enforce the Blockade; the conquest of a swathe of territory, a long corridor from Lithuania to St. Petersburg, extending somewhat like a thin icy finger waiting to be broken. Surrounded by hostile nations such as Sweden or forces waiting for a chance to throw off the French Imperial yoke such as Prussia, it was a region susceptible to attack by land and sea. In other words, conquest and control of the Baltic coastline and its cities would be more problematic than that of occupying the rolling Ukrainian countryside, somewhat like trying to seal and protect more than twice the length of the Normandy coastline without having occupied the French interior. And politically speaking, claims of legitimacy and diplomatic arguments would be on a less firm footing in an occupation of St. Petersburg compared to the cause of Ukraine liberation (the western portions the Ukraine in any case being not so long before part of Poland). Furthermore, the Ukraine was farther from the conceptual heart of Europe, especially in the eyes of the Napoleon’s most worrisome neighbors to the north and east. Thus, even a partial liberation of the Ukraine, the western half, a square delineated and protected by the Dnieper River, with Ukrainian, Cossack, and Ottoman cooperation, would have been the more feasible and sustainable project, one that might even possibly produce offsetting revenues as the ‘Breadbasket of Russia’.
Yet the most important question of course is, what really was in Napoleon’s best interest? And the answer is, of course, not a conquest of Russia. How so? Obviously so, since every success that Napoleon would have hypothetically had with a phased plan of conquest would have only increased the enmity of Russia from red to white rage. Without utter annihilation, Russia would one day strike back and win during one cold winter. Without complete conquest, Russia would become the steadfast ally of England. But how then save face for the breech of—and enforce—the Continental Blockade? Some sort of action was necessary, an action that would give Napoleon the needed bargaining chip to force Russia to maintain the Blockade. The Ukraine would have been that Irrefusable Bargaining Chip, one that could be returned to Russia, with guarantees from Russia to protect the rights of the Ukrainian ‘citoyens’. ---Now whether or not those rights would actually be protected, his goal would be achieved, and a pretext for future reconquest would be in place...
We may conclude that an actual, ongoing administration of a substantial part of Russia by France would have been an awkward and unwieldy affair, the whole idea in fact being somewhat absurd, in face of his uncured Spanish ‘ulcer’—the prolonged Vietnam style warfare ongoing in Spain. Besides that, Napoleon’s main threats to his position, not under his direct or indirect military control, were England, Russia, and Sweden. But his one true implacable, formidable enemy was England, and stated plainly, he should have left it that way.
Stage III: Looking beyond the question posed, to the most fundamental issues, thanks to having posed the IF question
青山康高 2021年9月20日「後書 ナポレオンのロシア遠征」に関する解説
2021.09.20
Afterthought to the Afterword
Instructive Ifs of History and Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia
The Real Issue was neither Russia nor England, but Prussia and Austria Hungary
Yasutaka Aoyama, PhD
Thinking over the various alternatives to the course of action Napoleon took regarding the Russian campaign, the deeper issues he faced become more apparent. In a nutshell, Napoleon’s empire was held together only by the threat of his personal military leadership against rebellion. Whenever he was away on some campaign, somewhere was up in arms. What he truly needed to do was to create natural allies whose interests converged with his, even if it meant reducing his degree of direct control over territorial matters. His main problem, stated simply, was that of the other powers repeatedly ‘ganging up’ on him. For while he could defeat the army of any single power near home on land, his nemesis was the grand alliance of multiple great powers combining against him. Thus, if anything, the invasion of Russia, or any further conquest on Napoleon’s part, first required offering other great powers incentives to support the status quo he created, especially Prussia and Austria Hungary.
The problem with his Russian invasion plan was that it was neither ‘here’ nor ‘there’. In other words, in order to succeed, it’s objectives should have been either A) much, much, smaller in scale and duration, or B) much, much, bigger in scale and duration. One or the other. We have already discussed in the original paper the former idea, of a much more limited and temporary occupation of the Ukraine. On the other end of the scale, if he had opted for a more massive, permanent conquest of western Russia, what Napoleon should have done was 1) give the Ukraine to Austria Hungary as compensation for the lands in the west taken from it after being defeated at Wagram in 1809, and 2) give the Baltic states to Prussia as compensation for the lands west and south taken from it after being defeated at Jena Auerstedt in 1806.
This would more than make up for the square miles they had been deprived of earlier, and would make those two states, in the eyes of Russia, eternal enemies, and thus natural allies of France. The Baltic territories would represent an enormous increase in overall territory for Prussia, and the Ukraine a very useful boost to Austria Hungary, shifting their territorial centers of gravity toward the east. Napoleon could then rely on the ir support, even if a full-fledged invasion of Russia failed, to defend their newly gained territories. The whole of Prussia and Austria Hungary would become marvelous de facto buffer states for France much as they would be so in the 20th century for Russia. And the ensuing Battle of Leipzig, which Napoleon lost, and thus lost his whole empire, would then not have been a battle of Russia combined with Prussia and Austria Hungary against France, but rather Russia embattled and surrounded by the combined forces of France, Prussia, and Austria Hungary, in which case Napoleon could hardly have lost.
However, we must conclude in the final analysis, that even if Napoleon was able to bend the motives of Prussia and Austria Hungary to converge with those of his own, his empire would not have lasted beyond his lifetime----no, shorter than that, never beyond his own ability to actively command. For if ever there was such a thing as an inevitability in history, where no ifs apply, it must be the eventual fate of the Napoleonic Empire. Until 1820, or very generously speaking 1825, is the longest the empire could have lasted, given that Napoleon would have lived perhaps 5 or more years longer, had he continued to rule with the best medical attention. For he had no equals among his relatives, none coming close to his skill in warfare (even the brave Eugène de Beauharnais, his adopted son, could hardly have done for Napoleon what Octavian did for Caesar); and none among his generals, though highly competent military men (Davout lacked charisma, Ney political sense, etc.), had the credibility and multiple skills needed to hold sway over the whole whole empire, dotted with Napoleon’s mediocre relations sitting atop crumbling thrones... Already in declining health, and knowing that his active style of field command would be near nigh impossible once over 50, he could have calculated that he had at best 8 years to ensure his empire could run on autopilot, or otherwise fail the moment his health failed him.
But could Napoleon have have ever allowed himself to relinquish his crown, to let’s say Eugène, and have Davout become Eugène’s grandest marshal, with the other generals like Berthier, Ney, and Suchet professing allegiance to Eugène instead of himself, in his presence? Could Napoleon have allowed himself to become a ‘retired emperor’ and merely high ‘counselor’ of the realm? Could his ego have allowed Eugène to lead ‘La Grande Armée’ to victory, himself staying at home reading books, saluting from from his window Eugène and Davout’s triumphal return? For that would probably be the only way he could assure the continuation of his Empire, without the rest of Europe getting up in arms after his death. The answer is likely not; for it goes against everything we know of Napoleon’s limelight--loving personality. He was too much Alexander and not enough Cyrus——that is to say, he was good at stepping forward, fighting and conquering, but not at giving way, making friends out of losers, or winning without fighting when there was a way to do so.
Could anyone have persuaded him that it would be for his greater glory? That it would be known forever more as the most sagacious decision of his career, a brilliant stroke proving him unequaled not only as soldier but as statesman, and that history’s final judgement of an empire’s success is its longevity? Perhaps, if there was someone who could make him see it clearly that way; ——but alas, I was not there to advise him!
2020.4
Musings on the subtle and ironic aspects of historical causation
The Lesson Hitler Learned from Napoleon III
Yasutaka Aoyama, PhD
All men, no matter how original they might seem, have their sources of inspiration----footsteps they follow, role models who supply them with a methodology of achieving success. And of such role models, those models in the recent past, fresh in a civilization's memory, are the most convincing. Hitler too, had his needed prototypes for success and self-justification in the era preceding him, in often overlooked men when discussing Hitler, like Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, or Napoleon III. For what counts most is not who were Hitler's professed role models----such as Frederick II of Prussia, Napoleon I of France, or Alexander the Great of Macedonia----but rather what history actually offered to him as a proven, successful strategy tailored to his specific needs in a modern nation state.
What Napoleon III did, Hitler followed, in terms of the basic political strategy of gradually usurping power in a democratic nation. We might even say that in one sense Hitler was the culmination of what Napoleon III started. In France, Victor Hugo's criticisms of Napoleon III, in his book Little Napoleon, went unheeded; but if the country had stood up for democracy by voting against Charles Louis' gradual usurpations of political power and the reestablishment of empire, historical consensus would have branded such attempts as futile, and set a discouraging precedent against similar attempts in the foreseeable future. Not that it would prevent those who had formed a hardened conviction from trying to do so, but precedents of a successful stand against usurpation make it easier to recognize and foil future attempts, and perhaps more importantly, by altering the cognitively conducive path to where history might flow it would have altered what we may call the evolution of convictions. Ironically, France itself, in one sense, by overthrowing its republic and reinforcing the imperial precedent, contributed subtly and indirectly, to the rise of its greatest enemy in the century to come.
Thus it would seem, that dedication and commitment to our own stated ideals does in fact prove to be our best insurance against the wrong doing of others against us. Not because of some divine ordination or Kantian absolute value as such, but because that is the way historical causation works----through unforseen cognitive linkages between the past and present. Adherence to ethereal idealism is in fact the more farsighted realpolitik, while Machiavellian expediency is simply an exchange of short term benefits for greater future costs, in a dynamic working very much like payoffs in investing and borrowing----except that the future payoffs of upholding political and ethical ideals are indeterminate, incalculable, and astronomically large.
青山康高 2021年10月2日 「もしも」なき歴史学？カーディシーヤの戦い 正統カリフ軍対ササン朝ペルシャ軍
October 2, 2021
No IFs of History Here?
How Rostam Could Have Won the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah,
and Why He Simply Couldn’t
Yasutaka Aoyama, PhD
Introduction
The battle of al-Qadisiyyah, fought between the armies of the Rashidun Caliphate and the Sassanian Empire, on the western bank of the Euphrates River on the plains of al-Qadisiyyah, in 636 AD, was the last major stand to by the Sassanians to stop the relentless advance of Islamic forces into the Persian empire.
The Commanders
The Sassanian marshal, Rostam Farrokhzad, would eventually become renown as a hero of Ferdowsi's epic poem Shahnameh, while the Rashidun commander, Sa'ad ibn Abī Waqqās, was one of the original companions of the prophet Muhammed, known as the seventh person to embrace Islam.
Summary of the Overall Battle
A grueling, utterly exhausting battle for both sides fought over 4 days during which the forces clashed repeatedly each day. Thus in fact, it was not one battle, but many battles fought to a stalemate, with the engagements tending to be a seesawing affair, each gaining an advantage until being pushed back, continuing so until the final defeat of the Sassanians on the 4th day, when Rostam was assasinated during the confusion of a sandstom by an enemy slipping through the lines; ----after which the Sassanian lines crumbled, and the battle was lost. But if Rostam had not been killed then, who knows how many more 'sub-battles' would have been fought at al-Qadisiyyah.
A Golden Opportunity Lost on the First Day, the 'Day of Disorder'
Out of those many confrontations, there was only one clear opportunity for the Sassanian side to win (in this author's opinion), and that was early on in the first day, known infamously as the 'Day of Disorder'. On that first day, Rostam had his left flank advance against the Moslem right flank, which was pushed back quite a ways, at which point a signifcant advantage presented itself to the Sassanians, making the whole Moslem right flank vulnerable.
Certainly Alexander or Nader Shah (of the 18th century) would have pounced upon such an advantage, possibly leading the attack in person. Unfortunately for the Sassanians, Rostam, who was valorous and not unintelligent and adaptive to circumstances, nevertheless lacked superior strategic sense and tactical nimbleness, and possessed little originality, qualities the Arab commanders often displayed. Rather than seizing the moment, he waited to see how things played out; and in the meantime when Sa'ad saw his right flank losing ground, he naturally sent reserve units to reinforce it----something that could of been foreseen by Rostam----and alas, the advantage was gradually lost. One senses a certain inertia in the way Rostam watched events from his centrally placed throne, mimicking the airs of a Darius, but without the true suppleness of mind that was the hallmark of Cyrus, a true king of kings.
Overview of the Rashidun Caliphate (Moslem) and Sassanian Imperial (Persian) Armies, shown below
Yellow formations at the top facing down: Sassanid forces estimated at approximately 60,000 or somewhat more
Green formations along the bottom facing up: Rashidun forces approximately 30,000
The Sassanid commander Rostam’s basic battle formation, as can be seen along the top of the picture above, was 4 large divisions, basically equal in size and composition, arrayed symmetrically in squares, possibly deep as they were wide, composed mainly of infantry (with long spears and long swords) in the front lines, archers with powerful bows behind, heavy cavalry units in the rear, and 33 war elephants placed up front, 7 on each side and the rest of the 19 up front in the center. Rostam stationed himself in back centrally positioned with his small reserve cavalry, while princely commanders lead the four divisions, among whom Jalinus was perhaps the most resourceful.
The Rashidun commander Sa'ad drew up his army in like formation, in 4 divisions to match that of the Sassanians it was facing, but was substantially less in number. Its archers were equiped with less powerful bows, its light calvary on horseback (and camel? no war elephants) about 7,000 or so in number. It was mostly composed of infantry, who though not as heavily armoured (using long spears and short Roman gladius style swords) as the Sassanians, were more experienced and skilled in hand to hand combat, and morale was high. Sa'ad stayed in back, right of center, with cavalry reserves, letting his energetic captains like Asim ibn Amr take the initiative.
How Rostam could have Won
Analysis of Rostam's Strategy and its Shortcomings
Rostam’s strategy was to make an all out attack on the Arab right flank using his division on his left flank, and from there commence an attack with his three remaining divisons all along the Arab front line. Though he was successful in pushing the Arab left flank quite far back, eventually the tide turned, and Rostam's spearheading division was pushed back to where it started----thus all for naught.
But why did it turn out so? Why when it had such initial success, was the Sassanian advance upon the enemy's right flank pushed back?-----The answer is, because Rostam simply didn’t have the extra fuel that was required to turn it into a full victory. He needed to be able to follow up on his initial success, by having additional resources to pass the baton on to, to take full advantage the situation. If he was first going to make an all-out attack on the enemy's right flank, he needed to be committed to winning through with it, or otherwise not let it continue so far, and then simply let it run out of steam.
Once he had pushed back the extreme right Arab division back, that would expose the neighboring center right division's right side. He required additional units to attack there, as well as cavalry units to sweep wide around the retreating Arab extreme right and attack the rear of the Arab formations. And that meant substantially overweighting his spearheading division with additional horsepower, elephantpower, and firepower, before commencing the attack (in anticipation of Moslem reinforcements that would naturally come to its aid).
Needed Tactical Redeployment of Rostam's Units
How then specifically, could Rostam have overweighted the spearheading division, inconspicuously and without substantially weakening the rest of his line? In fact, without much difficulty, by the three following minor adjustments shown in the diagram below:
Blue Lines: Sassanian Heavy Cavalry. Shift cavalry units, but not so obviously so that it would catch the attention of the enemy. Shift 1/3 of the cavalry of each of his 2 central divisions, over to his extreme left of his line, since after all, having a large cavalry in the center is really not necessary. This would mean a 67% increase in calvary in the spearheading division, the kind of minimal additional striking power he needed.
Thin Grey Lines: Sassanian War Elephants. Add 2 more elephants to the 7 in his left flank spearheading division, taken from the center of 19 elephants, and perhaps another elephant from the center to the opposite right flank as well, or close to it, so as not to seem too weighted on the left flank. (Any more shifts beforehand of those conspicuous war machines would have been a dead give away as to what Rostam was going to do, and make his center and right vulnerable). This would have meant a 29% increase in his elephant-tanks for the spearheading division (the added punch that can make a big difference) and only a 16% decrease to his center force of elephants, who from the start were more numerous anyway, and thus by the redistribution, the length of the entire front line would be more evenly distributed with elephants.
Orange Lines: Sassanian Archers. Increase the number of archers in his left central and left flank spearheading division, by redistributing a quarter of the archers from each of Sassanian divisions on the right to the 2 divisions on the left, that would then have 25% more archers than they had before, an important boost to offensive power.
As far as the ordering and arrangement within the spearheading left flank division, Rostam should have placed a good number of the extra archers to the rear of that division, on its right side, with the extra calvary units it obtained from the central divisions placed behind those rear archers.
Alternative Strategy
Alternatively, he could have overweighted the opposite end of his line, his right flank, commencing instead with a light feint from his left flank on the right Moslem flank, and making instead his right flank the spearheading division against the Arab left flank. In either case, if he planned to take the offensive and strike first, he had to create a point of concentrated power somewhere, which he failed to do.
The above was the minimum he needed to consider to carry through any plan, which otherwise ended up becoming a classic case of a 'half-baked' strategy.
More Personal Guard and Reserve Units
Finally, as common sense in warfare, where so much depends on the commander in chief's life, Rostam needed to have a larger personal guard, both in terms of a bodyguard (or subordinates near him who would act as such) and reserve units at his side that he could directly order into action without waiting, or lead personally. Alexander and Napoleon did so (though the latter was overly protective of his numerous Guard, failing to deploy it when needed); Rostam's failure to sufficiently protect his own person was the direct cause of the Sassanian defeat.
Proposed Sequence of Deployment, Phase I
Furthermore, he should not have had his plan so easily divined. He should have made a feint to the Arab left wing, or a full slow mobilization of all divisions to camouflage his intentions, to draw attention elsewhere.
For example, he could have had the 3 other divisions advance more slowly, at the same time, pouring a particularly heavy shower of arrows on the Arab right central division from the archer loaded center left division, while his right flank could make conservative, skirmishing feints on the Arab left flank with calvary, but keeping the elephants and infantry in good order, with orders not to press the attack but go only 1/3 or half the way, hunkering down at that point until the spearheading movement at the other end really got underway.
The Manner in which the Actual Battle Commenced
The way the actual battle started was in the following manner shown below, with the far left Sassanian division simply pressing forward, with no substantive changes in the division's strength:
The actually extent of the Sassanian advance probably went further than shown in the diagram above, pushing the Arab right flank quite a ways back. Sa'ad responded by reinforcing the faltering division with his own reserve cavalry, as well as siphoning troops off the neighboring center right division, to push the Sassanians back, which they did. The Moslem line was reestablished, and the Sassanian advantage evaporated. In any case Rostam had waited too long in sending in his other divisions forward. The chance to win the battle slipped from his hands, and what followed was a general engagement of all the divisions, ending in a stalemate for the day.
Proposed Sequence of Tactical Deployment, Phase II
Instead, had Rostam had the additional units ready, those units would come into action at this point in the battle, just after having successfully pushed the Moslem division back, before it was reinforced, in the manner shown in the diagram below:
After the spearheading division pushed the right Arab flank back as shown above, the additional cavalry units would sweep wide around the Arab extreme right, and attack the rear of the Arab formations while his main force battled the Arab right flank division head on. The Arab center-right division' right side would be exposed, and in close proximity as the Sasssanian spearheading force passed by it, thus allowing a triangulating attack on the center-right Arab division with arrow fire from 1) Rostam’s archer plentiful center left division in front of it, and 2) from the spearheading division's extra archers in the rear as that division passed by—with probable devastating effect—reducing the Arab center-right division’s ability to aid the flank division to its right, and slow any decisions by Sa'ad to send reserves to bolster his extreme right. Rostam would have thus succeeded in weakening the entire Arab right wing, with his own two right wing divisions now moving steadily forward, keeping good order, so as not to allow elements of Arab left wing to be dispatched to aid its crumbling right wing.
Proposed Sequence of Tactical Deployment, Phase III
And if Rostam had just a wee bit of Alexander's flair, he might have at least rode over to the the back of his left wing with his reserve cavalry units, (as marked in purple), capable of assessing the situation's needs and sending in his cavalry, or joining himself if it were the straw to tip the scales totally in his favor. Being in that new location, he would have the choice of a) making a wide circle going either around the Arab flank, or b) filling in the gap between his spearheading extreme left and his more slowly advancing center- left division, depending on the circumstances, or even 3) dividing his reserve cavalry between the two. If he could do all this, the rest would be straightforward: folding the Rashidun forces into a tighter space, using his left and right wings like the blades of a slow moving pair of scissors.
But alas,----I was not there to advise him!
Conclusion
Medieval vs. Modern Military Mentalities
Common sense as it might seem, it was probably a plan almost impossible to execute in reality, though physically and logistically quite simple. Was it due to a sort of built in cognitive inertia? A fixed conception of military combat, depending of valour, numbers, and destiny? In the final analysis, it seems that the Sassanians of the 7th century did not have a modern sense of generalship, nor even a conception of tactics that Alexander had used on the Persians almost a millenium earlier, while the Moslem forces did----one of the main reasons for their consistent success.
The Sassanid mentality was strikingly similar to the medieval European one, with their heavy cavalry, their reliance on armor, their code of chivalry--all prescient of European knighthood to come. Indeed, the Sassanid generals often challenged their Arab counterparts to single combat before the battle and the Arabs would oblige them, which almost always ended with the Sassanids losing their leaders. This difference in mentality reminds us also of the difference in strategic awareness between the Mongols and the European armies with their kings they decimated centuries later. A difference of thinking that might be called 'ages apart', much like the difference between a medieval vs a modern mentality.
A key difference between a medieval, or rather feudalistc military and a modern military mentality might be described as that of a localized, regionally rooted thinking process vs. a multi-front, supra-regional conceptualizing process. This is the point of commonality between early Islamic success and that of the Mongols later. While the former was based on a transcendental religious conception of self, space and time, the latter was based on an ethnic goal oriented conception of self, without boundaries of space and time.
The Sassanid leadership had become increasingly feudal, each personally tied to specific regions, certainly more so than the Achaemenid rulers they emulated, who were more universal in their thinking. What the Sassanians needed to learn from the Achaemenids more than anything else was that particular frame of mind, not just adorning themselves with the symbols of universal power. If they had, they would have become more strategically oriented thinkers even on the battlefield----because good strategy is basically a frame of mind.
Universalism and Tribalism, the Winning Combination
If we scrutinze the problem and subject it to further analysis, we find it is not just a global mentality----an outlook without geographical borders or goals without numerical limits----that was the key to Moslem success. Rather, it was that combined with a very tribal lifestyle, tribal values, and a tribal sense of community. This was true with both the Arabs after conversion and the Mongols after unification. Both became universal in their outlook and boundless in their objectives, while at the same time being extremely tribal in their lifestyles and moral values. The Sassanians had turned into the reverse of that. They had become sedentary, urban, prosperous in lifestyle and values, regional in their outlook and identity, in their finally decades viewing the rest of the world as peripheral zones beyond true interest somewhat reminiscent of ancient China, and even their dynastic struggles and infighting reverberate with that nation's dynastic history.
Based on this analysis, we can also account for the relative strengths and weaknesses of warring nations in other historical conflicts, and even the strengths of nations today. The strength of Japan from the Meiji period to the WWII postwar period until the latter 20th century, may also be regarded as deriving from the possession of these two contrasting qualities, just as its present day weakness can be attributed to the reversal of those attributes.
Image credits:
Images of the underlying maps battle formations (excluding the colored arrows which have been added by the author) are from the Youtube video:
Kings and Generals
'Early Muslim Expansion - Khalid, Yarmouk, al-Qadisiyyah DOCUMENTARY'
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